The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 - Implications for NAFTA by Bucci, Dean C
NOTES
THE CUBAN LIBERTY AND DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY AcT OF
1996-IMPLICATIONS FOR NAFTA
Dean Bucci*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the accompanying end of Soviet
subsidization, the Cuban economy has gone from unhealthy to anemic-esti-
mates place it at 40 percent of what it was in the early 1990s.1 Desperate
to keep his economy afloat, Fidel Castro has reluctantly opened the door to
limited capitalism.2 But much more trade and foreign investment is needed
if the starved economy is to survive. Thus, Castro is increasingly inviting
the world's businesses to invest in Cuba on his terms. However, Castro's
tenacious adversary to the North has seized upon Cuba's state of weakness
in an attempt to deal the death knell to the Castro Regime.
Led by Representative Dan Burton, R-Ind., the U.S. House of Representa-
tives voted on September 21, 1995, to adopt the "Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act"3 by a 294-130 margin. Under
the sponsorship of Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, R-N.C., the Senate voted to pass a scaled down
* J.D. Candidate, May 1997, The University of Georgia School of Law; B.A., B.B.A,
May 1994, University of Georgia Southern. The author would like to thank and dedicate this
Note to Frank J. and Carmen A. Bucci. Without their continuous efforts, the writing of this
Note would never have occurred.
I Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
114, § 2(1), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 785, 786 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6022 et seq.
(1996)).
2 See Kevin Fedarko, Open for Business, TIME, Feb. 20, 1995, at 51.
3 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1995, H.R. 202, 104th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1995), Pub. L. No. 104-114, 22 U.S.C.S. 6021 (enacted).
4 Bryan T. Johnson, The Cuba Bill: Protecting the Property Rights of Americans,
Backgrounder (Heritage Repts. No. 441), Dec. 7, 1995, at 1, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Hftpts File.
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version of the bill the following month.5
One of the Act's most controversial provisions allows both Americans and
non-Americans to sue any post-Castro government and any foreign
businesses that have utilized nationalized businesses on the island.6 Another
troubling section of the Act denies a visa to any foreign national that has
confiscated property of United States nationals or "trafficked" in such
property.7
Not surprisingly, the international community is outraged. The European
Union made explicit as early as 1995 that passage of the Act would strain
relations with the U.S., and Canada has threatened retaliatory measures!
Even the Clinton Administration initially threatened to veto the Act,9 but
after Cuba's attack on two unarmed U.S. planes, President Clinton signed the
bill into law in March of 1996.10 Clinton did, however, suspend until the
new year the date upon which lawsuits could be filed against foreign
companies"-a suspension which he extended for an additional six months
' S.381, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), Pub. L. No. 104-114 (enacted.). The Senate
passed LIBERTAD on October 19, 1995, by a 74 to 24 vote. A filibuster and late
maneuvering allowed passage only after Senator Helms withdrew the controversial "trafficking
provisions" (Title IH). Id.
LIBERTAD, supra note 1, § 302, 110 Stat. 785, 815 (1996).
Id., § 401, 110 Stat. 785, 822 (1996). The terms "confiscated" and "confiscation" refer
to the seizure by the Cuban Government of ownership or control of property without the
property having been returned or adequate compensation provided, or without the claim to the
property having been settled, and the failure of the Cuban Government to pay debts resulting
from the confiscation of such property. See id. § 401(6)(2), 110 Stat. 785, 823 (1996), for
a complete definition. A person "traffics" in confiscated property if that person knowingly
and intentionally transfers, purchases, invests in, uses, benefits from, etc. See Pub. L. No.
104-114, 22 U.S.C.S. 6021, at § 401(b)(2) for a complete definition.
8 Ann Davis, Helms to Cuba: See you in Court, NATIONAL LAw JOURNAL, July 10, 1995,
at Al.
' Steven Greenhouse, Bill to Ease Cuba Suits Faces Veto by Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Aug
19, 1995, at A4.
10 Linda Robinson et al., Cuba Takes a Stiff Belt. Washington Wants to Hurt Castro by
Punishing Foreign Firms on the Island But Will They Go?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
July 1996, at 36-37.
" d. The LIBERTAD Act provides the President with the authority to suspend the
effective date of section 302 liability for trafficking in confiscated property if the President
determines that the suspension is necessary to the U.S. national interest and will expedite a
transition to democracy in Cuba. LIBERTAD, supra note 1, § 306(b)(1), 110 Stat. 785, 821
(1996). The Act also provides the President with the authority to renew such additional
periods of not more than six months each. Id. § 306(b)(2), 110 Stat. 785, 821 (1996).
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in January of 1997."
Reasons for opposing the bill include many of the common complaints
about anti-Castro legislation. For instance, like the Cuban Democracy Act
of 1992,'3 the LIBERTAD Act involves extraterritorial application of U.S.
law because it provides for U.S. control of foreign subsidiaries whose parents
are American corporations. 4 Also, the bill's critics assert that it would
conflict with the North American Free Trade Agreement 5 which was
approved by Congress less than two years before the LIBERTAD bill left
House committee. 6
II. THE LIBERTAD AcT
A. Historical Background
From Spanish colonial times until the present, the history of Cuba has
been a turbulent one. Its people have suffered almost continual exploitation,
both from within and without. By the 1950s, although Cuba's economy was
capitalistic and its economy was strong in comparison to other Latin
American countries, little had changed.' 7 Sugar comprised seventy-five
percent of exports, making the island vulnerable to the drastic boom and bust
cycles of the sugar industry." This problem was compounded by the fact
32 Robert S. Greenburger, U.S. Holds Up Cuba Suits, Pleasing Few, WALL STREET
JOURNAL, Jan. 6, 1997, at A9.
"3 Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 §§ 1701-1712, 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 6001-6010 (West Supp.
1993).
,' The United States follows the nationality principle of jurisdiction whereby a parent-
subsidiary link or a shareholder-corporation link serves as a jurisdictional basis over a U.S.
national regardless of where the national may be. In contrast, the European Community
operates under a system of restricting its laws to persons, corporations, and products within
its borders. Trevor R. Jefferies, Note, The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992: A Rotten Carrot
and a Broken Stick?, 16 Hous. J. INT'L L. 75 (1993).
'5 North American Free Trade Agreement, drafted Aug. 12, 1992, revised Sept. 6, 1992,
Can.-Mex.-U.S., reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 289 (pts. 1-3), 605 (pts. 4-8 & annexes) (1993)
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA].
16 Implementing legislation of NAFTA (H.R. 3450) was passed by the House of
Representatives on November 17, 1993. 139 Cong. Rec. H9875 -HIO,047 (daily ed. Nov 17,
1993). The Senate approved on November 20, 1993. 139 Cong. Rec. S16,712-13 (daily ed.
Nov. 20, 1993).17 See RAMON EDUARDO RUIZ, CUBA: THE MAKING OF A REVOLUTION 48-51 (1968).
'a Id.
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that Cuba supplied primarily one market-the United States. Thus, the
economy was subject to policy makers in Washington who decided tariffs
and quotas for Cuban sugar imports. This dependence, coupled with heavy
U.S. ownership of Cuban sugar plantations, made the Cuba of the early to
middle twentieth century essentially a U.S. colony."
The effects of sugar's dominance were devastating: basic foods had to be
imported, and the economy could not keep pace with the population.20
Cuba's political situation was no better, as politicians consistently sought
power for personal aggrandizement. It was under these conditions that Fidel
Castro, gathering support through his promises of free elections and a
democratic government, led his revolutionaries into Havana in January of
1959 and completed the overthrow of the Batista regime.
Shortly after seizing power, Castro began to expropriate key industries and
to seize foreign-owned properties in the name of economic betterment.2
American demands for compensation were ignored. Also during the first
year of Castro's regime, Castro appointed several communist party members
to political office and engaged in economic relations with the Soviet
Union.' In response, the United States began to decrease Cuba's sugar
quota until it was eliminated altogether on July 6, 1960, with the passage of
the American Sugar Bill.' An economic embargo banning the exportation
of American goods to Cuba followed in October.2
By early 1962, Castro had expropriated all businesses of any significance
and nearly a third of the island's arable land. In all, Castro confiscated $1.8
billion of U.S.-owned property.' Furthermore, in that same year Castro
openly declared himself a Marxist-Leninist and announced that Cuba would
have only one political party and no electionsY
19 Id.
2 Ernesto Bentacourt, "The Revolution at Thirty: An Economic Assessment." The
Cuban Revolution at Thirty. (January 19, 1989). Washington, D.C.: The J.W. Marriott
Hotel.
21 id
' Wilkerson, supra note 17.23 id
' Shari-Ellen Bourque, Note, The Illegality of the Cuban Embargo in the Current
International System, 13 B.U. INT'L L.J. 191, 193 (1995).
2 Id. at 193.
2 Kirschten, Raising Cain, THE NATIONAL JOURNAL, July 1, 1995.
2 See SANDOR HALEBSKY & JOHN M. KIRK, CUBA: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF
REVOLUTION, 1959-1984 337 (1985).
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In February 1962, President Kennedy declared a complete embargo against
the island in an effort to isolate the Castro Regime.28 The United States
was also successful in procuring Cuba's expulsion from the Organization of
American States.29 The rest of the Latin American countries, with the
exception of Mexico, followed suit by breaking ties with Cuba. 30
Conditions between the United States and Cuba have continued to worsen
since the 1960s. After Cuba intervened in Angola in the face of U.S.
opposition, President Ford proclaimed that any hope of improved relations
between Washington and Havana were precluded." The Reagan Adminis-
tration oversaw the strict enforcement of the travel ban against the island and
introduced measures to make Cuba's foreign credit negotiations increasingly
difficult.32 In addition, the Administration pressured both Cuban-Americans
and American businesses abroad to refrain from making any shipments to
Cuba.33
In 1992, the U.S. sought to close the existing gaps in the embargo against
the island by passing the Cuban Democracy Act.' Its provisions urged
other nations to act in accordance with the embargo and allowed the
President of the United States to sanction any country providing assistance
to Cuba.3" But Castro's demise has apparently not come soon enough for
Washington, for it continues to turn out additional anti-Castro legislation.
B. LIBERTAD Findings and Purposes
Congress included a section of Findings' in the LIBERTAD Act to
illustrate the alleged need for the legislation. Initial findings describe current
28 Proclamation No. 3447, 27 Fed. Reg. 1,085 (1962), reprinted in 22 U.S.C. § 2370
(1994).
" U.N. SCOR, 17th Sess., 5075th mtg. at 16-18, U.N. Doc. S/5075 (1962).
'0 LOUIS A. PEREZ, JR., CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES: TIES OF SINGULAR INTIMA-
CY 238 (1990), at 260.
31 ROBERT E. QUIRK, FIDEL CASTRO: THE FULL STORY OF HIS RISE TO POWER, HIS
REGI E, Is ALLIES, AND HIS ADVERSARIES 750 (1993).
' Perez, supra note 30, at 261.
33 m
3 Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 §§ 1701-1712, 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 6001-6010 (West Supp.
1993).
351 d
3 LIBERTAD, supra note 1, § 2, 110 Stat. 785, 786 (1996).
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economic 7 and social3s conditions in Cuba, but most of the findings
describe the oppressive Castro regime.3 9 Specific findings assert that the
Cuban government engages in illegal international narcotics trade,' harbors
fugitives from justice in the United States," supports international terrorism
and violence,42 and continues to utilize such forms of terror and oppression
as torture, political imprisonment, and exile.43
Congressional Findings relating to the Castro regime's abuse of the Cuban
people are numerous. For instance, the Findings section tells of the horror
that results from citizens attempting to leave the country. In some cases, the
section alleges, the Cuban government has held innocent citizens hostage
merely because their family members have left the island without permis-
sion." Even worse, those caught trying to escape are often imprisoned or
killed.45
Apparently, international organizations have taken notice of the inhumane
conditions in Cuba as well. Congress points out that the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights has repeatedly condemned the unacceptable
human rights situation in Cuba and has passed Resolutions appointing a
Special Rapporteur to the island.' However, the Castro government has
made clear its refusal to comply with such United Nations resolutions. 7
Subsequent Findings imply that the Act's provisions are not unprecedented
internationally. For example, one Finding explains that the United Nations
has determined that massive and systematic violations of human rights may
constitute a "threat to peace" and has imposed sanctions against nations due
to such human rights violations." Congress also parallels its actions
7 Id. § 2(1).
38Id. § 2(2).
" Id. § 2(4) - s 2(7).
40IM § 2(13), 110 Stat. 785, 787 (1996).
41 id.
42 IM § 2(14).
4 iM § 2(15).
44 I § 2(17).
' Id. § 2(18) (referring to the confirmed murder of more than 40 men, women, and
children who attempted to leave Cuba on July 13, 1994).
46 IM § 2(20), 110 Stat. 785, 788 (1996).
' Id. § 2(21) (stating that the Cuban government has formally expressed its decision not
to "implement so much as one comma" of the United Nations Resolutions appointing the
Rapporteur).
4These nations include Rhodesia, South Africa, Iraq, and the former Yugoslavia. Id §
2(24).
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against Cuba with the United Nations Security Council's resolutions
authorizing the use of "all necessary means" to restore Haiti's democratically
elected government.49 The Findings note that these resolutions lead to the
ousting of the military dictatorship." Perhaps most significantly, Congress
states that for the past 36 years, the Cuban Government has posed and
continues to pose a national security threat to the United States.51
The listed purposes of this Act are as follows: to assist the Cuban people
in obtaining their freedom and prosperity,52 to seek international sanctions
against the Castro government, a to provide for the national security of the
United States,5' to encourage free and democratic elections in Cuba,55 to
develop a plan to provide assistance to a transition government and later to
a democratically elected government in Cuba,-" and to protect against
confiscatory takings and wrongful trafficking in property seized by the
Castro Regime.5
C. LIBERTAD Provisions
Section 102 provides for the enforcement of the pre-existing economic
embargo of Cuba. First, Congress urges the President of the United States
to encourage other countries to respect the economic embargo of Cuba"
and to impose sanctions consistent with the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992
against all nations not doing so."" The Act also strengthens provisions of
the Trading With the Enemy Act dealing with civil fines for non-complying
individuals and confiscation of articles involved in violations.('
Section 110(b) of the Act reaffirms that the United States' membership in
the North American Free Trade Agreement in no way alters United States
49 Id § 2(26).
so Id
"' Id § 2(28), 110 Stat. 785, 788 (1996).
52 Id § 3(1).
5' Id § 3(2).
'4 Id § 3(3).
55 Id § 3(4), 110 Stat. 785, 789 (1996).
56 Id § 3(5).
Id § 3(6).
Id § 102(a)(1), 110 Stat. 785, 792 (1996).
SId § 102(a)(2).
60 Id § 102(d)(1), 110 Stat. 785, 792-793 (1996).
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sanctions against Cuba.61 Special attention is given to the NAFTA
provision allowing the United States to ensure that Cuban products or goods
made from Cuban materials do not enter the United States through Canada
or Mexico and that products from the United States do not end up in Cuba
via these countries."'
Title II of LIBERTAD shifts focus from Cuba's government to its people
by setting forth plans to assist the Cuban people when the Castro government
is replaced by a transition government or a democratically elected govern-
ment. After the establishment of such a government, the President may take
steps to end the economic embargo of Cuba,63 to provide various forms of
assistance to Cuba," and to seek the agreement of other countries, interna-
tional institutions, and multilateral organizations to provide additional
assistance to the island.('
Section 302 is one of the more controversial provisions of the Act. This
section establishes liability for trafficking in property confiscated from
United States nationals by the Castro Regime.' Any person, agency, or
instrumentality of a foreign state who performs such trafficking shall be
liable for monetary damages to any United States national who owns the
claim to such property.67
"1 This section of the LIBERTAD Act points out that the statement of administrative
action accompanying NAFTA states that "The NAFTA rules of origin will not in any way
diminish the Cuban sanctions program... .. Nothing in the NAFTA would operate to override
this prohibition." Id § 1 10(b),(b)(1), 110 Stat. 785, 800 (1996).
62 1I § 110(b)(2), referring to Art. 309(3) of NAFTA.
63 1I § 204(a), 110 Stat. 785, 810 (1996).
" Id. § 202(b)(2), 110 Stat. 785, 806 (1996).
6' d § 202(e), 110 Stat. 785, 807 (1996).
66 A person "traffics" in confiscated property if that person knowingly and intentionally
(i) sells, distributes, ... or otherwise disposes of, . . . or holds an interest in confiscated
property, (ii) engages in a commercial activity using or otherwise benefiting from confiscated
property, (iii) or causes, directs, participates in, or profits from trafficking by another person,
... Id. § 4(13), 110 Stat. 785, 790-791 (1996).
6 Id. § 302(a)(1), 110 Stat. 785, 815 (1996). The amount for which the trafficker shall
be liable to the claimant of the confiscated property is an amount equal to the sum of:
mhe amount which is the greater of (I) the amount, if any, certified to
the claimant by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission under the
International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, plus interest; (11) the amount
determined under section 303(a)(2), plus interest; or (III) the fair market
value of that property, calculated as being the then current value of the
property, or the value of the property when confiscated plus interest,
whichever is greater, and (ii) court costs and reasonable attorneys fees.
Id. § 302(a)(1)(i).
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Equally as controversial is Section 401 which excludes from the United
States any aliens who have confiscated property from United States nationals
or have trafficked in such property." This exclusion extends to corporate
officers, principals, or shareholders with a controlling interest of an entity
which has been involved in such confiscation or trafficking.' Additionally,
this provision applies to spouses, minor children, or agents of an individual
excludable under this Title.70
I. NAFTA
A. NAFTA Historical Background
Since World War II, the United States has principally relied on multilateral
agreements such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade71 to open
foreign markets.72 But later, the United States began to focus on bilateral
free trade agreements." For instance, while proceeding under the Uruguay
Round of GATI', the United States became involved in the U.S.-Canada Free
Trade Agreement. 74 However, the GATT negotiations reached an impasse
in 1990 when the European Community and the U.S. were unable to reach
an agreement over agricultural subsidies.75
Given the impasse in the GATT negotiations, the United States began to
consider trade expansion outside Europe. Thus, the United States was
receptive to Mexican President Carlos Salinas' request for United States-
Mexico bilateral negotiations for a free trade agreement, and in June of 1990
President Bush and President Carlos Salinas finally announced their intent
a Id., § 401, 110 Stat. 785, 822 (1996). See supra note 7 for definitions of "trafficking"
and "confiscated property" as used in this section.
SId. § 401(a)(3).
70 Id. § 401(a)(4).
71 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATI].
7 See Harold H. Koh, Congressional Controls on Presidential Trade Policy Making After
INS v. Chada, 18 N.Y.UJ. INT'L L. & PoL. 1191, 1196-97 (1986).
7 The U.S. entered into two free trade agreements before NAF1A: The United States-
Israel Free Trade Agreement, Apr. 22, 1985, U.S.-Isr., 24 I.L.M. 653, and the United States-
Canada Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., 27 I.L.M. 281 [hereinafter U.S.-
Canada FrA].
74 Id
75 See GILBERT R. WINHAM, THE EvOLUTION oF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
86-94 (1992).
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to pursue such an agreement.76 In February 1991, President Bush added
Canada as a party to the free trade negotiations," but passage of a final
agreement between the three countries was no easy task.
The primary obstacles to Congressional support for NAFTA concerned
labor and the environment.78 But President Bush eased tensions and won
over support in Congress by issuing his "Action Plan"79 in which he
promised to maintain close bipartisan cooperation throughout the negotia-
tions,' to ensure assistance to dislocated workers, to expand bilateral labor
cooperation with Mexico,"' and to develop a program of U.S.-Mexico
environmental cooperation.' The Bush Administration went on to com-
plete NAFTA negotiations before the 1992 presidential election.
However, labor and environmental concerns remained strong throughout
the election, and newly-elected President Bill Clinton sought ratification of
the bill only after securing supplemental agreements in these areas."s Still,
passage of the bill remained an uphill battle for the President as labor and
environmental groups persuaded a significant number of democrats to oppose
NAFTA's passage. In the end, these factions were defeated. Through
effective use of the newly-elected president's political momentum and the
media, President Clinton swayed the intensely divisive Congressional debate
in his favor and secured NAFTA's passage in November of 1993."
7 6 Commitment to Reach North American Free Trade Agreement: Chronology, in Bureau
of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, 3 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 565-67 (July 20, 1992).
" Joint Statement Announcing Canada-Mexico-United States Trilateral Free Trade
Negotiations, 1991 PUB. PAPERS 111 (Feb. 5, 1991).
7See Edmund W. Sim, Derailing the Fast-Track for International Trade Agreements, 5
FLA. INT'L LJ. 471, 481 (1990).
7H.R. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 102D CONG., 1ST SESS., EXCHANGE OF LETTERS
ON ISSuEs CONCERNNG THE NEGoTiATIONS OF A NORTH AMERiCAN FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT 1-3 (COMM. PRINr 1991).
8* Id. at 2.
81 Id.
82Id.
' James Gerstenzang & Michael Ross, House Passes NAFTA, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1993,
at Al, A16.
" See Gwen Ifil, How Clinton Won: 56 Long Days of Coordinated Persuasion, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 19, 1993, at A27.
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B. NAFTA Provisions
1. General Provisions
NAFTA is a very extensive agreement. Not including the two supplemen-
tal agreements, the Act itself is made up of over two thousand pages, eight
parts, twenty-two chapters, and many indices. Part One, the General Part,
begins with NAFTA's objectives.8 5 Among these are the liberalization of
trade in goods and services, removal of barriers to investment, protection of
intellectual property rights, and the establishment of a framework for further
trilateral, regional, and multilateral cooperation to expand and enhance the
Agreement." Chapter Two of Part One provides the Act's general
definitions. 7
Part Two, Trade in Goods, provides that each party to the Agreement shall
confer national treatment to the goods of another party in accordance with
Article III of GATT." This part also contains annexes, including one on
Trade and Investment in the Automobile Sector, 9 and one on Textiles and
Apparel Goods.90 Also within Part Two are chapters dealing with Rules of
Origin,9 Customs Procedures,' Energy and Basic Petrochemicals,93
Agriculture and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,' and Emergency
Action.95
The following part, Technical Barriers to Trade, provides standards-related
measures.96 Government Procurement is covered by Part Four,' while
Part Five governs investment, services, and related matters.98 Part Six
8 NAFTA, supra note 15, ch. 1, art. 102, 32 I.L.M. at 297.
86Id.
I ld. ch. 2, 32 I.L.M. at 298.
s Id ch. 3, 32 I.L.M. at 299.
Id. ch. 3, annex 300-A, 32 I.L.M. at 320.
s Id. ch. 3, annex 300-B, 32 I.L.M. at 327.
9 1d ch. 4, 32 I.L.M. at 349.
9 Id. ch. 5, 32 I.L.M. at 358.
9 Id ch. 6, 32 I.L.M. at 364.
9 Id. ch. 7, 32 I.L.M. at 368.
" Id. ch. 8, 32 I.L.M. at 383.
96 1& ch. 9, 32 I.L.M. at 386.
97 Id. 32 I.L.M. at 613.
" 1& 32 I.L.M. at 639.
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covers intellectual property,99 and Part Seven governs administrative and
institutional provisions,' °° including dispute settlement procedures. 101
2. Free Flow of Business Travelers
In order to facilitate trade and investment °2 the Agreement includes a
chapter providing for free flow of business."° Under Chapter Sixteen,
each government must allow business travelers who are citizens of other
NAFTA member countries to enter their respective countries." 4 To ensure
that the purpose of this provision will not be frustrated, each party is further
required to limit any fees for processing applications for temporary entry to
the approximate cost of services rendered."°  However, an exception is
made for entries involving labor disputes:"°6 Article 1603(2) allows a
country to deny the entry of a business traveler if such entry might adversely
affect either the settlement of a labor dispute that is in progress at the
intended place of employment' °7 or the employment of any person in-
volved in such a dispute.13 8
If a country chooses to invoke the 1603(2) exception, 9 it must inform
the business person in writing of the reasons for the refusal ° as well as
promptly notify in writing the country whose citizen was denied entry.'"
9Id. ch. 17, 32 I.L.M. at 670.
"0o Id. 32 I.L.M. at 681.
1 Id. ch. 20, sec. B, 32 I.L.M. at 693.
' Art. 1602 provides that each party "shall expeditiously apply .... (the measures of
Article 1601), so as to avoid unduly impairing or delaying trade in goods and services or
conduct of investment activities under this Agreement." Id. ch. 16, art. 1602(1), 32 I.L.M.
at 664.
103 Id. ch. 16, 32 I.L.M. at 664.
'" Id., art. 1603(1), 32 I.L.M. at 665. This article maintains that "each party shall grant
temporary entry to business persons who are otherwise qualified for entry under applicable
measures relating to health and safety and national security, in accordance with this chapter,
including the provisions of Annex 1603." Id.
'05 Id. art. 1603(4), 32 I.L.M. at 665.
' 6a art. 1603(2), 32 I.L.M. at 664.
' Id. art. 1603(2)(a), 32 I.L.M. at 665.
to8 Id. art. 1603(2)(b), 32 I.L.M. at 665.
109 Id.
10 Id. art. 1603(3)(a), 32 I.L.M. at 665.
" Id. art. 1603(3)(b), 32 I.L.M. at 665.
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The latter notification must also explain why the business traveler was not
permitted entry.
112
To ensure that the objectives of chapter Sixteen are met, the parties can
take the extra step of creating a "Temporary Entry Working Group"
comprised of representatives from each party."' This group is to meet at
least once yearly to consider the implementation and functioning of business-
traveler entry provisions.. and to further develop measures facilitating
such entry."'
3. Dispute Resolution
Though the Agreement places great emphasis on guaranteeing the free
flow of business travelers, it only allows a party complaining of a violation
of Article 1603 to utilize the general dispute settlement proceedings under
Article 2007 in certain circumstances." 6  The alleged violation must
involve a pattern of practice," 7 and the business person must have exhaust-
ed all administrative remedies involving the matter."'
According to Article 2004, any disputes arising between two or three
NAFTA governments with respect to the interpretation or application of
NAFTA shall be resolved according to Chapter Twenty." 9 This chapter
establishes the Free Trade Commission to be comprised by ministers or
cabinet-level officials of each country as the central institution of
NAFTA,' 2° as well as the Secretariat to provide administrative assistance
to dispute settlement panels and other bodies.'
2
'
112 id
"' Id art. 1605(1), 32 I.L.M. at 665.
114 Id. art. 1605(3)(a), 32 I.L.M. at 665.
15 Id. art. 1605(3)(b), 32 I.L.M. at 665.
16 Id art. 1606(1), 32 I.L.M. at 665.
117 Id art. 1606(1)(a), 32 I.L.M. at 665.
1I Id art. 1606(1)(b), 32 I.L.M. at 665. The remedies referred to are deemed exhausted
if the competent authority does not issue a final determination of the matter within one year
of the institution of an administrative proceeding, and such failure is not attributable to delay
caused by the involved business person. Id art. 1606(2), 32 I.L.M. at 665.
19 Id art. 2004, 32 I.L.M. at 694.
'20 Id art. 2001, 32 I.L.M. The Commission shall (a) supervise the implementation of
NAFTA, (b) oversee its further elaboration, (c) resolve disputes regarding interpretation or
application, (d) supervise the work of all committees and working groups established by
NAFTA, and (e) consider any other which may affect NAFTA's operation.
123 Id art. 2002, 32 I.L.M. at 693.
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The actual dispute resolution functions are rather complex. Generally, a
complaining party may decide whether to pursue a dispute settlement in
either a NAFTA or a GATT forum, subject to certain limitations.1" If a
party believes that any actual or proposed measure may affect that govern-
ment's rights under NAFTA,1 3 it may request consultations with the
governments concemed." If the disputing governments cannot reach an
agreement within thirty days" of the request for consultations, any
country that took part in the consultations may request a meeting of the
Commission," which will convene within ten days of receipt of the
request and endeavor to resolve the dispute quickly.'" If the Commission
has not resolved the matter within thirty days or some other agreed-upon
period, any party may request the establishment of an arbitral panel.'s
Unless agreed otherwise, this panel must issue its initial report within ninety
days of the selection of the last panelist.'" Finally, the panel shall, unless
otherwise agreed, issue to the parties a final report no longer than thirty days
after issuing its initial report."
', Article 2005 provides that disputes regarding any matter arising under NAFTA or
GATT may be settled in either forum at the complaining party's discretion. Id. art. 2005(1),
32 I.L.M. at 694. However, before the complaining party initiates the proceeding, it must
notify the two other governments. If the parties cannot agree on the appropriate forum, the
dispute will be settled under NAFTA. I. art. 2005(2), 32 IL.M. at 694. Also, if the
responding party claims that the action relates to the environment, health, safety, conservation,
or is subject to an environmental or conservation agreement under Article 104, the dispute
must be settled under NAFTA. Id. art. 2005(3) & (4), 32 I.L.M. at 694.
"3 This Article applies to a complaint by one country that another country has acted or
is proposing to act in a manner that is or would be inconsistent with the Agreement or cause
the impairment of benefits that the complaining government reasonably expected from
NAFrA. Id. art. 2004, 32 I.L.M. at 694.
'4 Id. art. 2006, 32 I.L.M. at 694.
1'Id., art. 2007(l)(a), 32 I.L.M. at 695. Article 2007(1) provides three exceptions to the
normal thirty day period in which the parties may resolve the matter: the parties have forty-
five days to resolve the matter if any other party subsequently requested or participated in
consultations on the matter, id, art. 2007(l)(b), or fifteen days in matters concerning
perishable agricultural goods, id, art. 2007(l)(c), or any other period that they may agree on.
6 Id. art. 2007, 32 I.L.M. at 695.
'27 I, art. 2007(4), 32 I.L.M. at 695.
'2 Id., art. 2008(1), 32 I.L.M. at 695.
'29 I, art. 2016, 32 I.L.M. at 697.
m3 hId, art. 2017, 32 I.L.M. at 697.
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Upon receipt of the final report, the disputing parties must attempt to
resolve the dispute in general accordance with the final report. 131 If the
final report reveals that the panel has found that a measure is inconsistent
with or impairs the Agreement, and the parties still have been unable to
resolve the matter within thirty days of receipt of the final report, the
complaining party may suspend from the adverse party NAFTA benefits of
equivalent effect to those which were or may be impaired as a result of the
disputed measure. 1 2  However, no party may create by domestic law a
right of action to challenge another government's measures.
133
4. Exceptions
Chapter Twenty-one contains exceptions to the Agreement's provi-
sions." The first exceptions refer to "general exceptions" set out in
GATT dealing with health and the environment. 3 Perhaps most relevant
is the national security exception, 36 which provides that a government may
act in a manner which would otherwise be inconsistent with the Agreement
to protect its national security interests. The Agreement provides only
limited guidelines for this provision,137 as the exception is generally self-
13 hI, art. 2018, 32 I.L.M. at 697.
132 Id, art. 2019, 32 I.L.M. at 697.
133 1& art. 2021, 32 I.L.M. at 698.
'34 Id ch. 21, 32 I.L.M. at 699.
'3 GATT, Art. XX(b) provides exceptions for measures necessary to protect human,
animal, or plant life or health. Art. XX(g) provides exceptions for exhaustible natural
resources. These GATT provisions are incorporated into NAFIA by Article 2101. Id. art.
2101, 32 I.L.M. at 699.
'36 hi, art. 2102, 32 I.L.M. at 699:
137 Article 2102 provides that, "subject to Articles 607 (Energy - National Security
Measures) and 1018 (Government Procurement - Exceptions), nothing in this Agreement shall
be construed: (a) to require any party to furnish or allow access to any information the
disclosure of which it determines to be contrary to its essential security interests; (b) to
prevent any party from taking any action that it considers necessary for the protection of its
essential security interests (i) relating to traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war
and to such traffic and transactions in other goods, materials, services and technology
undertaken directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military or other security
establishment, (ii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations, or (iii)
relating to the implementation of national policies or international agreements respecting the
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; or (c) to prevent any
party from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter
for the maintenance of international peace and security. NAFTA, supra note 15, art. 2102,
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judging in nature; however, each government expects that its provisions will
be applied by the others in good faith.
138
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Business Travelers
The LIBERTAD Act seeks to assist the Cuban people in obtaining their
freedom 139 and provides for assistance to a democratic post-Castro govern-
ment."4 Apparently, the Act's supporters hope that a tighter embargo will
lead to such a transition of the Cuban government. But these same
individuals also realize that no embargo can completely choke off Cuba so
long as other nations continue to trade with the island. Thus, the drafters of
the LIBERTAD Act hope to discourage not only American citizens but also
non-U.S. citizens from trading with or investing in Cuba.
The Act presents a foreign company or citizen considering dealing with
Cuba with a choice: avoid dealings involving confiscated property or be
denied entry into the United States' and become subject to potential
liability to the claimant of such property. 42 But the means Congress has
chosen to deter non-citizens from dealing with Cuba indicate that Congress
has also made a choice: it has chosen to conflict with provisions of NAFTA
in its quest for an admittedly powerful tool of deterrence.
In order to remove barriers to trade and to facilitate business transactions
between the U.S., Canada, and Mexico, NAFTA provides for the free flow
of business travelers between member countries. 43 Given limited excep-
tions,'" no party shall deny a business traveler from a NAFTA country
entrance into its respective country. 45 The resulting conflict is obvious:
any Mexican or Canadian corporate officer, principal, or controlling
32 I.L.M. at 699.
13 NAFTA, pt. 8, ch. 21, (A)(2), available in 1993 WL 561204 (N.A.F.T.A.).
LEBERTAD, supra note 1, § 3(1), 110 Stat. 785, 788 (1996).
'40 Id. § 3(4), 110 Stat. 785, 789 (1996).
141 See id. § 401(a), 110 Stat. 785, 822 (1996).
142 See id. § 302(a)(1), 10 Stat. 785, 815 (1996).
143 NAFTA, supra note 15, art. 1601, 32 I.L.M. at 664.
'" E.g., id art. 1603(2), 32 I.L.M. at 665. provides an exception if the entry of the
business traveler might adversely affect the settlement of a labor dispute in progress at the
intended place of employment.
145 Id art. 1603(1), 32 LL.M. at 665.
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shareholder of an entity which has trafficked in confiscated U.S. property in
Cuba, or a spouse, minor child, or agent of such individual, will be denied
a visa to enter the United States"-a right explicitly guaranteed by
NAFTA.
147
B. National Security Exception
The conflict between the NAFTA temporary entry provision'" and
LIBERTAD's section denying entry visas 49 becomes readily apparent by
a simple reading of the agreements. Thus, the question becomes whether an
exception exists which can somehow justify this conflict. The applicable
GAIT exceptions dealing with health and the environment are certainly not
helpful,"5 but perhaps the NAFTA national security exception' is
relevant. After all, the Findings of the LIBERTAD Act purport that the
Castro government threatens international peace and security by engaging in
acts of armed subversion and terrorism,152 that its massive and systematic
human rights violations may constitute a threat to peace,153 and that "for
the past 36 years, the Cuban government has posed and continues to pose a
national security threat to the United States."'' "
There is no question that Congress has a great and encompassing role in
providing for the national security. Some of these powers are clear and
direct. For instance, the plain letter of the Constitution gives Congress the
power to declare war.1 55 But Congress also has power to provide for the
national security by less direct policy making. 156 Also, the Supreme Court
6LIBERTAD, supra note 1, § 401(a), 110 Stat. 785, 822 (1996).
'4 NAFTA, supra note 15, art. 1603, 32 I.L.M. at 665.
M'' Id. art. 1603(1), 32 I.L.M. at 665.
'49 LIBERTAD supra note 1, § 401(a), 110 Stat. 785, 822 (1996).
1'0 GAiT, supra note 71, art. XX.
'51 NAFTA, supra note 15, art. 2102, 32 I.L.M. at 699.
152 LIBERTAD, supra note 1, art. 2(14), 110 Stat. 785, 787 (1996).
113 Id. § 2 (22)-(24), 110 Stat. 785, 788 (1996).
4 I. § 2(28).
155 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
56 The Constitution provides Congress with many indirect means of providing for the
national security. E.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the power to regulate
foreign commerce); id., art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (giving Congress the power to set rules for
nationalization); id, art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (granting Congress the power to define and punish
felonies on the high seas and offenses against the law of nations); id, art. I, § 8, cl. 18
(giving Congress the power to make all laws necessary and proper to execute other
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has repeatedly affirmed Congress' great latitude in establishing national
security policy. 57
But what constitutes a "national security exception?" This term is
ambiguous and has yet to be clearly defined. 5 The Supreme Court
provided some guidance when it declared that the term, as use in the
Veteran's Preference Act, was only intended to encompass government
activity involving direct protection of the country from internal subversion
or external aggression. 59 Under such a definition, no action to protect
national security from Cuba would be in order as Cuba presumably poses no
actual threat of foreign aggression. But the Court's definition may be
limited to the Act which it was then reviewing. Others define national
security as a prophylactic concept concerned with preventing potential
dangers." Under the latter definition, Congressional action would
probably be justifiable on the argument that the Castro regime continues to
create at least some potential danger to the United States and the free world
in general.
Unfortunately, the text of NAFTA does not conclusively define "national
security." The applicable article is relatively short and is not conclusive: it
states that nothing in the Agreement shall require a party to disclose
information essential to national security,' 6" nor prevent a party from
protecting its national security interests through actions relating to traffic in
arms or other military goods and services. 62 Nor shall any part of
NAFTA be construed to prevent actions taken in times of war or other
international emergency,"6 actions relating to policies or agreements on
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons," or to prevent any party from
constitutional powers). See Nancy-Ann E. Min, Toward More Intelligent National Security
Policy Making: The Case for Reform of Arms Control Impact Statements, 54 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 174, 176 (1986).
157 See generally Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1981) (stating the Court's
great deference to Congress in matters of national security); Kennedy v. Martinez-Mendoza,
372 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1963) (discussing the great latitude the Constitution grants to Congress
in foreign and military affairs).
158 See generally Minn, supra note 156, at 219.
15 Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536, 544 (1956).
160 See generally Note, National Security and the Amended Freedom of Information Act,
85 YALE LJ. 401, 407-14 (1976).
161 NAFTA, supra note 15, art. 2102(1)(a), 32 I.L.M. at 700.
162 Id., art. 2102(1)(b)(i), 32 I.L.M. at 700.
'3 Id., art. 2102(l)(b)(ii), 32 I.LM. at 700.
'"I d., art. 2102(1)(b)(iii), 32 I.L.M. at 700.
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complying with obligations under the United Nations Charter for the
maintenance of international peace and security." It is unclear, however,
whether any of these sections apply.
Indeed, most of the provided national security exceptions seem inapplica-
ble. The denial of entry visas is not designed to prevent disclosure of
confidential information or arms traffic, nor is the exception applicable due
to times of war. But perhaps the current situation in Cuba represents an
"emergency in international relations." Advocates of the Act would likely
claim that such an emergency exists,'" but it is unlikely that United States'
trading partners would agree. The Castro government has been in power for
over thirty-five years, and although it has undoubtedly been involved in
revolutionary activities in other parts of the world during that time, 67 such
activities are nearly, if not completely, over. Furthermore, as Cuba's
outdated communist economy continues to weaken, the Castro government
will be in less and less of a position to invest its limited resources in
conflicts beyond its borders.
Perhaps the exception applies because the LIBERTAD Act was created in
pursuance of obligations for the maintenance of peace and security under the
United Nations Charter. It is true that the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights has repeatedly reported on the unacceptable human rights
condition in Cuba and has appointed a Special Rapporteur to Cuba'
whom the Castro government refused to accept.'" It is also true that the
United Nations has determined that massive and systematic violations of
human rights may constitute a "threat to peace" under Article 39170 and has
imposed sanctions on other countries for such violations.17' However, the
United Nations has not placed economic sanctions on Cuba, nor has it
resolved that conditions in Cuba constitute a "threat to peace." Thus, if
'6' Id. art. 2102(1)(c), 32 I.L.M. at 700.
166 E.g., LIBERTAD, supra note 1, § 2(14)-(28), 110 Stat. 785, 787-788 (1996) (stating
that the Castro regime continues to be a threat to world peace).
'67 E.g., Quirk, supra note 31.
168 E.g., LIBERTAD, supra note 1, § 2(20), (22), 110 Stat. 785, 788 (1996).
1 E.g., id § 2(21) (noting that the Cuban government has formally expressed its decision
not to "implement so much as one comma" of the United Nations Resolutions appointing the
Rapporteur).
'70 U.N. CHARTER, art. 39, para. 21.
171 E.g., LIBERTAD, supra note 1, § 2(24) (noting that the United Nations has imposed
sanctions for the violation of human rights on Rhodesia, South Africa, Iraq, and the former
Yugoslavia).
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Congress purports to be acting in accordance with U.N. Charter obligations
regarding the maintenance of international peace and security, it must be said
that it is acting on its own initiative and under its own extension of general
United Nation Charter obligations.
C. Dispute Resolution
The United States' trading partners have already followed through on
threats to oppose LIBERTAD section 401 (denial of entry visas to traffickers
in confiscated goods) by pursuing the matter before world trade bodies."r
Notwithstanding possible available remedies under GATT, Canada and
Mexico will have viable remedies to pursue under NAFTA.73 However,
before having access to Article 2007 general dispute settlement proceedings
for the failure to grant temporary entry for business travelers, the Agreement
provides two special hurdles: the matter must involve a pattern of prac-
tice,174 and the business person must have exhausted all available adminis-
trative remedies regarding the matter.175  As stated previously, these
remedies will be deemed exhausted if no final determination has been issued
by the competent authority within one year of the institution of the
administrative proceeding.1 76
Regarding the conflict resulting from the LIBERTAD Section 401 visa
denial provision, these hurdles should not prevent the matter from coming
under general dispute settlement proceedings. Due to the permanent nature
of Section 401, the refusals of entry visas will certainly amount to a "pattern
of practice" and thereby satisfy the first requirement. As to the exhaustion
of available administrative remedies, it is unlikely that any administrative
authority will be able to settle the matter: assuming that the "competent
172 On February 3, 1997, the European Union requested that a WTO dispute-settlement
panel be appointed to examine the LIBERTAD Act. EU Calls on Mr. Ruggiero to Appoint
Members of the Panel that Will Give its Position in the Helms-Burton (Cuba) Law, REUTm
AGENCE EUROPE, Feb. 4, 1997, available in LEXIS, CURNWS Library. Shamefully, the
United States announced that it would boycott this panel. Brian R. Russell, Compounding
Blunders at WTO, J. COMM, Feb. 27, 1997, at 9A.
n" See NAFTA, supra note 15, art. 2004, 32 I.L.M. at 693.
'74 Id. art. 1606(1)(a), 32 I.L.M. at 665.
175 Id. art. 1606(1)(b), 32 I.L.M. at 665.
176 Id, art. 1606(2), 32 I.L.M. at 665. Also, the failure to issue a determination cannot
be attributable to delay caused by the business person. Id.
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authority" involved will be the Temporary Entry Working Group,1" whose
job it is to implement and administer temporary entry provisions,1 78 any
determination of the Group will be inadequate to repeal or prevent the
implementation of a provision of an act of Congress." Thus, the require-
ments would probably not prevent the alleged violation from reaching Article
2007 general dispute resolution, and their only practical effect would be to
delay the Article 2007 settlement proceedings for up to one year."s
Because Section 401 of the LIBERTAD Act is allegedly inconsistent with
NAFTA or causes impairment of NAFTA benefits,"1 Canada or Mexico
would have the right to take the matter to general dispute resolution. '
Thus, the complaining party could request consultations with the United
States," which if unsuccessful could be followed by a meeting of the
Commission."' If this likewise failed to resolve the dispute, Canada or
Mexico could request the establishment of an arbitral panel"' to issue an
initial report'" followed by a final report"" after which the disputing
parties would have their last chance to settle the matter." If the final
report states that the LIBERTAD Act's measures are inconsistent with
NAFTA, yet the parties are still unable to resolve the matter, the complain-
ing party would be allowed to suspend from the United States NAFTA
benefits equivalent to the benefits lost due to the United States' refusal to
issue the relevant entry visas. 9
'" The Temporary Entry Working Group is created by Article 1605. Id. at art. 1605, 32
I.L.M. at 665.
178 d
' The Temporary Entry Working Group shall be comprised of representatives from each
member country, including immigration officials. Art. 1605(1). Id art. 1605(1), 32 I.L.M.
at 665.
s See id art. 1606(2), 32 I.L.M. at 665 (providing that "the remedies referred to in
paragraph (l)(b) shall be deemed to be exhausted if a final determination in the matter has
not been issued by the competent authority within one year of the institution of an
administrative proceeding, and the failure to issue a determination is not attributable to delay
caused by the business person).
18 See supra note 116.
1'8 Id art. 2004, 32 I.L.M. at 694.
183 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
184 See supra notes 125-127 and accompanying text.
185 NAFTA, supra note 15, art. 2008, 32 I.L.M. at 695.
'" Id art. 2016, 32 I.L.M. at 697.
'7 Id art. 2017, 32 I.L.M. at 697.
t Id. art. 2018, 32 I.L.M. at 697.
18 la art. 2019, 32 I.L.M. at 697.
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Exactly how and to what extent a complaining party may retaliate is not
certain. The Agreement allows the suspension of benefits "of equivalent
effect" until an agreement is reached."9 It further provides that the
suspended benefits should be in the same trade sector(s) affected by the
matter at issue'9" unless this is impractical or ineffective." Also, a
disputant may request review of suspension of benefits which are "manifestly
excessive,"1 93 but exactly how a complaining party will retaliate cannot be
predicted. Obviously, retaliations will depend on the nature and the extent
of the dispute. But because the complaining party may choose, subject to
the aforementioned limitations, in what manner and for how long it will
retaliate, predicting retaliatory measures will always involve some specula-
tion.
If Canada or Mexico does retaliate with trade sanctions, this action could
jeopardize millions of dollars in U.S. exports.'" In 1991, the United
States exported $33.28 billion worth of goods to Mexico and $85.1 billion
to Canada. 95  The percentage of these figures that could be lost from
retaliatory sanctions is uncertain, but given the possibility of a relatively
small trade dispute giving rise to lost business deals, retaliation to retaliation,
poor governmental relations, and consumer backlash, substantial harm to the
United States could result should Mexico or Canada suspend trade benefits
in retaliation for the LIBERTAD Act's conflicts with NAFTA.
V. CONCLUSION
With the passage of NAFTA came the world's largest free-trade area: the
Agreement created a market of over 370 million consumers and $6.5 trillion
in goods and services yearly,196 and these figures are only initial estimates.
Trade between member nations grew dramatically under previous agree-
'90 Id., art. 2019(1), 32 I.L.M. at 697.
19 Id., art. 2019(2)(a), 32 I.L.M. at 697.
2 id., art. 2019(2)(b), 32 I.L.M. at 697.
193 Id. art. 2019(3), 32 I.L.M. at 697; see also id art. 2019 (4), 32 I.L.M. at 698
(providing that panel reviewing whether suspended benefits are manifestly excessive must
proceed under Model Rules of Procedure and is subject to 60 day review limit).
'9 Ann Davis, Helms to Cuba: See You in Court, NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, July 10,
1995, at Al.
'9 UNrIEb STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, U.S. FOREIGN TRADE HIGHLIGHTS
1991, 11 (1992).
'" See Trade Across a Continent, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 1994, at R4.
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ments: under the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, U.S. exports to
Canada increased by $12.9 billion between 1988 and 1992,'9 and U.S.
exports to Mexico grew by more than $24 billion from 1986 to 1992
following Mexico's market-opening initiatives of 1986.'" But these
figures are encouraging to the United States in more than dollar figures.
According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, for each $1 billion increase
in exports, 20,000 U.S. jobs are created.'99 Thus, the U.S. has an incredi-
ble amount to gain from NAFTA.
Likewise, the U.S. has much to lose from violating NAFTA. Nonetheless,
the LIBERTAD Act does just that. Section 401 of the Act ° denies
United States entry visas to aliens who have confiscated property of United
States nationals or who have trafficked in such property."t' But NAFTA,
which Congress approved not three years earlier, guarantees a right of entry
into the U.S. to these same business travelers from NAFTA nations.'
Perhaps the United States can justify its action under NAFTA's national
security exception which provides that nothing in the Agreement shall be
construed to prevent a member nation from taking steps to protect its
national interest. 3 But it is unlikely that this exception will justify the
denial of visas because the current situation in Cuba does not seem to
amount to a matter affecting national security as defined by the NAFTA text
establishing the exception.' Furthermore, even if Congress considers the
Cuban situation a matter of national security as provided by NAFTA article
1603, it is unlikely that Mexico or Canada will concur in any such judgment.
Thus, unless changes are made, it can be expected that Mexico or Canada
will ultimately be allowed to suspend from the United States NAFTA
benefits equivalent to the benefits lost due to the United States' refusal to
issue entry visas to Mexican or Canadian business travelers.'
197 UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, ECONOMYWIDE MODELING OF
THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE FTA WITH MEXICO AND A NAFTA wrrH CANADA AND
MEXICO: Addendum to the Report on Investigation No. 332-317 Under Section 332 of the
Tariff Act of 1930 (1992).
'19 Id.
199Id
2o LIBERTAD, supra note 1, § 401, 110 Stat. 785, 822 (1996).
201 IT
m NAFTA, supra note 15, art. 1603, 32 I.L.M. at 665.
m3NAFTA, supra note 15, art. 2101, 32 I.L.M. at 699.
204 See supra notes 151-? and accompanying text.
20 NAFTA, supra note 15, art. 2019, 32 I.L.M. at 697.
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While Congress sees the LIBERTAD Act as a means to quicken the
demise of the Castro government, tightening the embargo is not worth
jeopardizing our relationship with our principal trading partners. Castro's
government is weakening every year, and its collapse is inevitable with or
without the LIBERTAD Act. The ends that Congress seeks by this bill are
admirable, but the means it has chosen to reach those ends are unacceptable.
